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CASE NOTES
Antitrust—Clayton Act—First Attempted Use to Restrain a Joint
Venture—Application of a Rule of Reason.—United States v. Penn-
Olin Chem. Co.'—The Department of Justice initiated this action in the
United States District Court of Delaware to restrain Penn-Olin Chemical
Company (Penn-Olin), Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation (Olin), and
Pennsalt Chemicals Corporation (Pennsalt) from allegedly violating Section
7 of the Clayton Act 2 and Section i of the Sherman Act. 8 Pennsalt and Olin
had formed their joint venture, Penn-Olin, to compete in the production and
sale of sodium chlorate in the southeastern market, which was dominated
by two of Pennsalt's nationwide competitors. Prior to the formation of Penn-
Olin, Pennsalt had sold sodium chlorate in the southeastern market, and,
because of a price disadvantage arising from the cost of transportation from
its Portland, Oregon plant, it had contemplated building its own plant in the
southeast. Similar intentions were held by Olin (a substantial competitor of
Pennsalt in calcium hypochlorite), although it had never produced sodium
chlorate. Before either company completely rejected the idea of its individual
entry into that market, the joint venture was formed. The Government al-
ledged that the effect of the joint venture might be to substantially lessen
competition not only in sodium chlorate, but also in other non-chlorate
chemicals, particularly calcium hypochlorite. The court HELD: The Gov-
ernment failed to meet its burden of proof that the probable effect of the
joint venture would be the substantial lessening of competition in the rel-
evant southeastern market. The court stated that the joint venture would
be a more effective competitor than either Pennsalt or Olin individually, and
1 217 F. Supp. 110 (D. Del. 1963), petition for cert. filed, 32 U.S.L. Week 3178
(U.S. Sept. 27, 1963) (No. 503).
2 38 Stat. 730 (1914), as amended by 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. 	 18 (1958).
The pertinent parts read (with the portion added by the 1950 amendment italicized):
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the
whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and no corporation subject
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole
or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce,
where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.
• • • •
This section shall not apply to corporations purchasing such stock solely
for investment and not using the same by voting or otherwise to bring about,
or in attempting to bring about, the substantial lessening of competition. Nor
shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in com-
merce from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual
carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate
branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of the
stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such formation is not
to substantially lessen competition.
a 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 1 (1958). The pertinent parts
read: "Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several states . . . is declared to be
illegal. . . ."
415
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
that there was no evidence that both would have entered the market simul-
taneously.
The court, confronted with this first civil action under the Clayton Act
against a joint venture, patterned its analysis of the facts after the method
that has evolved from the merger cases arising under the 1950 amended
version of the Clayton Act' Although a joint venture "may be viewed as
a form of quasi merger,"5 it only achieves the results of a merger on a very
limited basis, and in a more roundabout fashion. Significant is the fact that
while a merger removes a corporation from competition, a joint venture
creates a new entity. Thus, since a joint venture° is not a merger, there was
pre-trial speculation as to the applicable standards of legality under the
amended Section 7 of the Clayton Act.
It had previously been decided under Section 1 of the Sherman Act
that "joint manufacturing ventures, even in domestic markets, are not made
unlawful per se by the Sherman Act, but become unlawful only if their pur-
pose or their effect is to restrain trade or to monopolize." However, Section
7 of the Clayton Act was intended to reach monopolistic tendencies "in
their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would
justify a Sherman Act proceeding." "And the legislative history of § 7 in-
dicates clearly that the tests for measuring the legality of any particular
economic arrangement under the Clayton Act are to be less stringent than
those used in applying the Sherman Act."° Thus, under the amended Clayton
Act, there was some reason to believe that joint ventures might be found
illegal per se, although several authorities had expressed their opinions that
such was not the case. 1°
4 The usual method is for the court to define the relevant market. Then, within
this relevant market the competitive effects on the economy are determined. For a
discussion of a recent Supreme Court decision employing this method see More Ado
About Mergers: Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 4 B.C. Ind. & Com. L. Rev. 159
(1962).
5 Kaysen and Turner, Antitrust Policy, An Economic and Legal Analysis, 136 (1959).
A joint venture, such as here, goes by many names: "jointly-owned subsidiary,"
"fifty-fifty corporation," "business cooperative," and "corporate partnership." Dixon,
Joint Ventures: What is Their Impact on Competition? 7 Antitrust Bull. 397, 398 (1962).
A definition, sufficient for our purposes, could be that a joint venture "is a corporation
whose stock is owned by other corporations and which engages in a business different
from that of its parents (even though the difference be only that it sells its product in
a foreign territory)." Hale, Joint Ventures: Collaborative Subsidiaries And The Anti-
trust Laws, 42 Va. L. Rev. 927 (1956).
7 United States v. Imperial Chem. Indus. Ltd., 100 F. Supp. 504, 557 (S.D.N.Y.
1951) accord, United States v. E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 118 F. Supp. 41,
219-20 (D. Del. 1953), aff'd, 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
8 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962), quoting S.
Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 4-5 (1950).
Id. at 328-29, accord, Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Antitrust Rep. 117 (1955) (here-
inafter cited as Attorney General): "This background immediately preceding amended
section 7 discloses the apparent Congressional objective of establishing more effective
rules against mergers. The Committee believes that this intention provides the main
guide to the administrative and judicial construction of that provision."
10 Boyle, The Joint Subsidiary: An Economic Appraisal, 5 Antitrust Bull. 303,
307 (1960): "As a matter of law, it is quite clear that joint corporate ventures are
not illegal per se." Kaysen and Turner, op. cit. supra note 5, at 137: "There has been
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It is against this background that the Penn-Olin decision should be
considered. While the case was still pending before the district court, several
commentators evaluated the facts in light of the strict Clayton Act and
concluded that "a decree in favor of the government would not be sur-
prising.""
The court, in deciding otherwise, appeared to read a Rule of Reasonu
into section 7 as it applies to joint ventures. It seemed to do this by balancing
the competitive advantages of the joint venture against the competitive
disadvantages, finding that the former outweighed the latter, and then re-
solving every doubtful issue in favor of the joint venture.
Illustrative of this approach was the court's conclusion that under the
relevant statute it would be illogical to hold a joint venture illegal per se.
There is a total lack of authority on this issue, as has been shown above.
Yet, the court seems to have decided that since on appearances the joint
venture did not seem to adversely affect competition, it should not fore-
close inquiry into the merits of the joint venture by a per se ruling.
Another indication of the court's adoption of a Rule of Reason was
the court's limiting the relevant market to the Southeast. This was an
essential part of the defendants' case, since a violation of section 7 clearly
existed if the market were found to be nationwide. Within this southeastern
market, the court found that the Government had not proved that any com-
pany had been deterred from entering into it.
But the Clayton Act is also concerned with future effects on competi-
tion," and the court summarily handled this issue by stating that "what
surprisingly little law on joint ventures as such.... [Ilt is safe to assume that they are not
illegal per se any more than mergers are.. . ." (Emphasis supplied.)
II Comment, Joint Subsidiaries and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 39 U. Det.
L.J. 223, 237 (1961). See, 14 Stan. L. Rev. 777, 786 (1962): "[Tlhe government appears
to have chosen a strong case in which to initiate joint ventures to the rigors of section 7.
The competitive situation most favorable to prosecution under section 7 would un-
doubtedly involve two currently competitive parents and a completely integrated joint
subsidiary producing for the same market. Where the operations of the joint company
are not vertically separated from its parents' market and where the joint company has
a significant share of that market, the situation lends itself to—indeed invites—terri-
torial division. Such arrangements are very uncommon in the corporate world. Yet
the arrangement in Penn -Olin comes very close to presenting a hypothetically ideal case
for the government."
It is submitted that the commentator of the above would not have been so definite
if he had foreseen that the court would limit its attention concerning sodium chlorate
to the relevant southeastern market, in which neither Pennsalt nor Olin were "actual"
competitors.
12 The "Rule of Reason", so-called, has never been applied to 7 of the Clayton Act.
Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 62 (1911) was the first case
to read a Rule of Reason into the Sherman Act. A recent case where the Supreme Court
dealt with the Rule of Reason as applied to the Sherman Act is White Motor Co. v.
United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), noted, 5 B. C. Ind. & Corn. L. Rev. 185 (1963).
to Handler and Robinson, A Decade of Administration of the Celler-Kefauver
Antimerger Act, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 629, 678 (1961): "The distinctive feature of the
Clayton Act is its emphasis on reasonable probability. It is not merely concerned
with what changes the merger has already wrought in the relevant market, but with what
is apt to happen in the future. It asks the tribunal to forecast the likely impact of the
merger on competition."
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Penn-Olin's effect in the future may be upon would-be entrants can only be
a matter of conjecture" It is submitted that, if sustained, this cursory
handling of an important part of section 7 would, in effect, do away with
this provision as a realistic test as applied to joint ventures. The court could
have examined the economic data to determine the probable future effects,
or it could have shifted the burden of proof to the defendants who might be
in a better position to come forward with relevant economic data?' Instead,
the court made no such attempts, saying that "the imponderables are too
great to hazard a forecast as to Penn-Olin's future deterrent effect. . . ?
The court followed this attitude of resolving doubt in favor of the
joint venture when it considered the Government's contention that the
joint venture prevented Pennsalt and Olin from competing amongst them-
selves in the production and sale of sodium chlorate in the Southeast. The
Government proved that both companies possessed the capability and the
interest of entering into the southeastern competition. However, the court
held that this was not sufficient under the standards of section 7, and that
it must be a matter of probability that both companies would "simultane-
ously" have decided to enter the field, or that the prior entry of one would
not have deterred the other. The court found that the most favorable
assumption that it could adopt "is that one company would have decided to
build while the other continued to ponder.""
It can be argued, as the Government has done on its appeal to the
Supreme Court, that the court's latter finding is, by itself, sufficient to con-
demn the joint venture, and that to require that the government go further
and prove that neither company would have lost interest had it been preemp-
ted by the other is to adopt an erroneous standard under section 7." But it
is submitted that this is another instance of a court's applying a Rule of
Reason, notwithstanding the validity of the argument that to take away
a potential competitor, "waiting in the wings" to enter the market when
competitive conditions are inviting, is a substantial lessening of competition. 1 °
In light of the court's finding that, at best, only one of the parents
would have entered the market, it remained to be decided whether the
joint venture would be less effective as a competitor than either of the
parents. The court found that in light of the combined experience of the
parents, it would be more reasonable to conclude that Penn-Olin would be
the better competitor. The court went on to elucidate how competition had
been increased since Penn-Olin's entry into the market. This was evidenced by
the fact that "actual and in-prospect production in the Southeast will have
more than doubled since the joint venture was entered into. ... »20
19 Supra note 1, at 128.
15 But see Bok, Section 7 Of The Clayton Act and The Merging of Law and Eco-
nomics, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 226, 253 (1960): "Another possible approach to section 7
is to hold for the defendant in any case in which the probable consequences of a merger
cannot be ascertained, on the ground that the government has simply failed to meet
its burden of proof."
to Supra note 1, at 128.
11 Id. at 130.
18 Brief for Appellant, pp. 17-18.
la Id. at 18.
20 Supra note 1, at 132.
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This latter fact of increased competition may well have been the
chief influence in resolving the court's attitude toward the joint venture.
The court found that "Penn-Olin was the means by which the strength
of the two companies was joined . . . to break into a market to challenge
the supremacy of two companies which were dominating it." 25 This factor
seems to have tipped the scales in favor of the joint venture when the court
balanced the competitive effects in its application of the Rule of Reason.
It is submitted that the court's Rule of Reason is entirely consistent
with the Congressional intent at the time of the 1950 amendment to the
Clayton Act. Congress was concerned with the protection of competition and
not competitors.22 It realized that there may be some mergers beneficial to
the competitive health of the economy."
Confronted with beneficial competitive effects, it seems not wrong for
a court to give less consideration to a fact, which under different circumstances
might render the whole transaction illegal. This is exemplified in Penn-Olin
by the fact that the joint venture gives the parents, who are substantial
competitors in another product, an opportunity for collusive action?' But the
court once again read a Rule of Reason into section 7 and held that "the
proof shows only an opportunity for illegal activities. That is not enough.
To equate opportunity for wrongdoing with likelihood of its occurrence
reflects a cynicism toward business behavior which is without warrant.'' 25
This latter statement by the court adequately reflects the attitude
with which it approached this joint venture. After examining the relevant
economic data," the court appears to have realized that if the beneficial
21 Id. at 125.
22 Supra note 8, at 320: "Taken as a whole, the legislative history illuminates
congressional concern with the protection of competition, not competitors, and its
desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such combinations may tend to lessen
competition."
23 Supra note 8, at 319: "[SI upporters of the amendments indicated that it would
not impede, for example, a merger between two small companies to enable the combi-
nation to compete more effectively with larger corporations dominating the relevant
market, nor a merger between a corporation which is financially healthy and a failing
one which no longer can be a vital competitive factor in the market." See Attorney
General, supra note 9, at 125: "Similarly, in a vertical acquisition, the fact that compet-
itors of one company are foreclosed from selling to the other need of itself signal no
reasonable probability of a substantial lessening of competition or tendency to monopoly.
On the contrary, the integration may create a company better able to compete with
larger rivals."
24 See Boyle, supra note 10, at 308: "The important issue, and one apparent at first
glance, is that the joint venture allows a common meeting place in which the sup-
posedly competitive firms may legally meet." See Kaysen and Turner, op. cit. supra note 5,
at 138: Among the potential risks of a joint venture are: (I) decisions on price, output,
etc. of the joint venturers "may be so intrinsically interrelated that they will differ sub-
stantially from those that would be made if the venture were independently owned. ...
(2) [That cooperation in the joint venture will spill over into collateral restrictive
behavior among the joint venturers, simply as a matter of close association. (3) [Tjhat
substantial market power in one market may be used to create similar power in others."
25 Supra note 1, at 134.
20 For mergers falling under section 7 it may be relevant, however, to study:
(1) character of the acquiring and the acquired company, (2) the characteristics
of the markets affected, (3) immediate changes in the size and competitive range
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competitive effects of Penn-Olin were to be utilized, a Rule of Reason
would have to be read into section 7. Otherwise, a literal reading of the Act
would surely have striken the joint venture to the detriment of the competitive
health of the relevant market.
WILLIAM J. MCDONALD
Antitrust—Clayton Act—Preliminary Injunction Seeking to Enjoin
Proposed Conglomerate Acquisition.—United States v. Food Mach.
Corp.'—The United States, proceeding in the District Court for the Northern
District of California under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 2 sought a pre-
liminary injunction against Food Machinery Corporation (FMC), and
American Viscose Corporation (Avisco), to enjoin the consummation of a
proposed acquisition of a substantial part of the assets of Avisco by FMC.a
Due to the decline of rayon and acetate in favor of new synthetic fibres, the
board of directors of Avisco considered that its shareholders would realize
the value of their investment only if the corporation's diminishing assets,
utilized in the production of cellulosic fiber (rayon and acetate) and
cellulosic film (cellophane), were sold to a willing buyer. Avisco com-
menced negotiations with FMC which culminated in a contract of Jan-
uary 31, 1963, for the sale of Avisco assets on June 28, 1963. FMC, a
widely diversified industrial company, which has never engaged in the fiber
or film industries, desires to acquire the assets of Avisco in order to gain
entry into the chemical fiber and film industries (nylon, orlon, dacron and
polyethylene). Although the United States sought to label the contemplated
acquisition vertical or horizontal, it was characterized by the court as con-
glomerate,4
 because it lacked the aspects of the former categories!' After
of the acquiring company and in the adjustments of other companies operating
in the markets directly affected, and (4) probable long-range differences that the
acquisition may make for companies actually or potentially operating in these
markets. Attorney General, supra note 9, at 125.
1 218 F. Supp. 817 (ND. Cal. 1963).
2 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1958).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act provides:
No corporation engaged in commerce . . . subject to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets
of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of com-
merce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be sub-
stantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
a The court has jurisdiction to grant the relief sought in accordance with the
provisions of Section 15 of the Clayton Act which empowers a district court to "make
such temporary restraining order or prohibition as shall be deemed just in the premises"
pending final decision. 38 Stat. 736 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1958). In addition to the
various agencies specifically charged with enforcement of the Act, the Department of
Justice has broad equity powers to seek relief enjoining violation of any part of the
Act. The injunctive relief in this case is sought under the above authority.
4 Congress has described conglomerate mergers as "those in which there is no
discernible relationship in the nature of business between the acquiring and acquired
firms." H.R. Rep. No. 1191, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1949).
5 There were no horizontal aspects because FMC and Avisco had not competed in
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